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I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
The National Conversation on Public Health and Chemical Exposures is a collaborative project, 
supported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry (ATSDR). The National Conversation vision is for chemicals to be used and 
managed in ways that are safe and healthy for all people. The project’s goal is to develop an action 
agenda with clear, achievable recommendations that can help government agencies, tribes, and other 
organizations strengthen their efforts to protect the public from harmful chemical exposures. The National 
Conversation Leadership Council will author the action agenda, utilizing input from six project work 
groups and members o f the public who chose to participate in web dialogues and community 
conversations and offer comments.
National Conversation work groups were formed to research and make recommendations on the 
following six crosscutting public health and chemical exposures issues: monitoring, scientific 
understanding, policies and practices, chemical emergencies, serving communities, and education and 
communication.
This report is the product of the Chemical Emergencies work group’s deliberations. While issued to the 
National Conversation Leadership Council, the work group hopes that this report will be o f value to 
others in a position to act on the recommendations contained herein.1
CDC and ATSDR worked with several groups to manage the National Conversation, including 
RESOLVE, a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the effective use o f consensus building in 
public decision-making, the American Public Health Association, the Association o f State and Territorial 
Health Officials, and the National Association o f County and City Health Officials. These organizations 
and others helped ensure that a broad range o f groups and individuals were engaged throughout this 
collaborative process, including government agencies, professional organizations, American 
Indian/Alaska Native tribes (AI/AN), community and non-profit organizations, health professionals, 
business and industry leaders, and members o f the public.
For more information on the National Conversation project, please visit 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/nationalconversation.
a. Membership
Work groups were formed in 2009 following an open nomination process. Work group members were 
selected based on a three-stage process designed to ensure that each work group would have the capacity 
to address and reflect different individual and organizational perspectives.2
1 This report was developed as part o f the National Conversation on Public Health and Chemical Exposures, an independent 
process facilitated by RESOLVE, a neutral non-profit consensus building organization. This report represents the work o f one of 
six National Conversation work groups and reflects the consensus o f the work group members. Consensus is defined as each 
member being able to “live with” the report taken as a whole, rather than as agreement with each recommendation. Members 
were asked to participate as individuals, rather than on behalf o f their organizations or constituencies. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention’s National Center for Environmental Health and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
provided funding for the facilitation, member travel, meetings, web dialogues, community conversations, and other costs 
associated with the National Conversation. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, RESOLVE, or other organizations involved in the 
National Conversation.
2For additional information on the work group member selection process, see 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/nationalconversation/docs/membership selection process report.pdf
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In selecting members o f the Chemical Emergencies work group, the following additional criteria were 
considered: 1) relevant area o f expertise, 2) depth o f experience and reputation in the individual’s field, 3) 
an interest in serving on this work group, and 4) suitability for this work group as opposed to other work 
groups. In particular, the work group considered those who have been a voice for community and 
environmental justice concerns. Furthermore, to achieve overall balance, the team sought to compose a 
diverse work group in terms o f work experience, perspective, gender, and geographic region.
Andrea Kidd Taylor, assistant professor, Morgan State University, served as chair o f the Chemical 
Emergencies work group, and was supported by Rear Admiral Scott Deitchman of the U.S. Public Health 
Service Commissioned Corps, incident manager for the CDC Response to the Deepwater Horizon spill 
and NCEH/ATSDR senior liaison to the Chemical Emergencies work group; Dana Goodson, senior 
facilitator, and Jennifer Peyser, senior mediator, at RESOLVE; and Montrece McNeill Ransom, senior 
public health analyst, NCEH/ATSDR.
A full list o f members o f the Chemical Emergencies work group can be found in Appendix A.
b. Charge
After much discussion, the work group members agreed to the following charge to guide their work:
Chemical Emergencies: preventing, preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and 
mitigating chemical incidents.
Chemical emergencies can be devastating to human and animal populations, the environment, 
and the economy. Safeguarding public health requires analyzing and eliminating vulnerabilities; 
identifying and communicating information about hazards; and reducing risks through the 
development and implementation of effective emergency prevention, preparedness, and response 
plans. While many public and private agencies have roles in chemical emergency prevention, 
preparedness and response, coordination among concerned parties has not been optimized. 
Further, there remain shortcomings, gaps, and redundancies in the chemical emergency 
preparedness system.
This group will make recommendations on issues including the prevention o f  chemical 
emergencies, chemical infrastructure security, monitoring o f  chemical facilities and 
events, and the preparedness and response capabilities o f  1) emergency management 
officials; 2) state and local public health agencies and their governing boards; 3) 
responders, receivers, and providers on the local, state, tribal, and federal levels; 4) the 
chemical industry; and 5) affected, or potentially affected, communities .
c. Process and M ethods Used
The full membership o f the Chemical Emergencies work group convened nine meetings (six conference 
calls and three in-person meetings) toward the development o f this report. Two topical subgroups were 
formed, and a series o f subgroup meetings were held, as described below.
Caveats, Limitations, and Subgroup Formation
The themes and concepts discussed in this report do not represent the entire range o f issues 
related to chemical emergencies, nor do they reflect in entirety each focus area o f the charge of 
the Chemical Emergencies work group. Work group members relied on research and professional
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expertise. For example, while there are myriad issues concerning transportation-related chemical 
emergencies, chemical infrastructure security, monitoring o f chemical facilities and events, and 
the preparedness and response capabilities o f the chemical industry, the work group’s range of 
expertise and time available did not allow for a comprehensive review of each o f these subjects.
The membership o f the work group decided to focus its considerations on the three themes that 
emerged from the Chemical Emergencies break-out session held at the June 26, 2009 National 
Conversation Kick-Off Meeting: 1) training and capacity building; 2) systems and coordination; 
and 3) community preparedness and response.3 Therefore, the work group divided itself into two 
subgroups to accomplish the tasks outlined in the charge: 1) Training and Capacity Building and 
2) Systems and Coordination. Work group membership considered developing a third subgroup 
that would focus specifically on community preparedness and response. However, given the 
crosscutting nature o f community issues related to chemical emergencies, members decided to 
ensure that both the Training and Capacity Building and the Systems and Coordination subgroups 
closely consider community issues related to their focus areas during their deliberations.
Subgroup Processes and Methods
Training and Capacity Building Subgroup
W anda Lizak Welles and Clark Phinney served as co-leaders o f the Training and Capacity Building 
subgroup. Members o f the subgroup included: Nathan Birnbaum, Jacque Darbonne, Jim Eaton, Joseph 
“Chip” Hughes, Nancy Hughes, Todd Jordan, Betsy Kagey, and Anthony Tomassoni.
This subgroup convened eight calls and focused on reviewing the current chemical response training of 
the nation’s emergency response and receiver communities to identify the gaps in and needs o f current 
capacity. This subgroup’s determination o f the current training status o f selected response communities 
was based on several factors: 1) group consensus following discussion, 2) direct personal knowledge and 
involvement o f subgroup members, 3) interviews and research performed independently by subgroup 
members and reported to the entire subgroup for review and discussion, 4) research and review of existing 
standards and regulations from various government, regulatory and certification bodies, as well as 5) 
knowledge o f professional and trade association literature and training curricula.
Recognizing that the subject o f emergency response training and capacity building is immense, the 
subgroup made a concerted effort to focus its attention and recommendations on the competencies and 
best practices o f the response community. Subgroup members sought to use a common language that has 
been well established in the responder community. For purposes o f its review, the subgroup focused on 
the first responders who are most likely to arrive on scene and provide immediate response to a chemical 
incident. These include, but are not limited to: fire, police, emergency medical services (EMS), and skill- 
specific response personnel such as hazardous materials (HAZMAT), public works, and industrial 
response teams. Within the first responder community, the fire service usually assumes lead command at 
a chemical emergency scene with EMS and law enforcement providing patient care and scene security 
respectively. While EMS and law enforcement may have national competencies and standards for 
responding to chemical emergencies, those standards and competencies are lacking in the hazardous 
materials content necessary to adequately prepare EMS and law enforcement personnel to respond to and 
identify chemical emergencies.
3 To view the meeting notes from the Chemical Emergencies Break-out meeting at the National Conversation Kick-off Meeting, 
June 26, 2009, see http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/nationalconversation/meeting june 26 09.html.
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While all three disciplines (fire service, EMS, and law enforcement), participate in some form of 
HAZMAT training, the continuity o f response training to a chemical emergency seems the least 
consistent among fire service personnel, due in part to the two types o f firefighters within the fire service: 
career (paid) and volunteer. The scope of the operations conducted by the fire service during chemical 
emergencies is broad, and providing public and responder protection is usually directed by fire service 
personnel. Therefore, the subgroup identified the training and capability needs among members o f the fire 
service as a priority for protecting responders, receivers, and the public during chemical emergencies. The 
intent was to utilize this group as a prototype to identify the training and capability needs o f all o f first 
responder groups.
Systems and Coordination Subgroup
The co-leaders o f the Systems and Coordination Subgroup were Darius Sivin and Fleming Fallon. 
Membership was comprised o f the following: Bill Benerman, Kathy Curtis, Kim Jennings, Mark Kirk, 
Jacqueline McBride, Maureen Orr, Paul Orum, Derek Swick, and Connie Biemiller Thomas.
This subgroup convened four calls. Overall, the subgroup attempted to take a systems or “big picture” 
approach to chemical emergencies, looking at the overall response system, rather than specific parts, 
outcomes or events. The subgroup engaged in a number o f activities that informed this report, although 
not all o f the individual and background work products from those activities were incorporated into the 
final report. These included researching and reviewing various chemical emergency case studies and 
developing a matrix describing the roles o f various public, private sector, and civil society actors during 
each phase o f emergency prevention and response. The matrix was used to identify unmet needs for the 
various phases and actors.4
The subgroup made recommendations on developing or improving the systematic coordination o f efforts 
by industry; local community organizations/groups; and city, state, and federal agencies in order to 
prevent chemical incidents, reduce hazardous chemical use, and provide communities with the 
appropriate education and skills necessary to gain access to chemical information and learn to respond 
effectively to chemical emergencies.
Terms and Definitions
For the purposes o f this document, a chemical emergency is defined as any actual or imminent threat o f a 
hazardous chemical release that has the potential for causing harm to people, plants, animals, property, or 
the environment. Chemical releases can be unintentional, such as an industrial accident; deliberate, such 
as a terrorist attack; or a result o f actions that are non-compliant with laws and policies (CDC, 2010). 
Chemical releases associated with food and crop contamination and natural disasters were also considered 
within the definition o f chemical emergencies.
The terms first responders and first receivers include persons involved in the initial aspects of 
emergency response. Although both are critical in the initial stages o f a response, there are differences in 
the types o f response they provide and in their training and experience. According to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), first responders are individuals who, in the early stages o f an 
incident, are responsible for the protection and preservation o f life, property, evidence, and the 
environment, including emergency response providers, as well as emergency management, public health, 
clinical care, public works and other skilled support personnel that provide immediate support services 
during prevention, protection, mitigation, response and/or recovery operations (OSHA 2007).
4 The work product o f the systems subgroup can be found under the Chemical Emergencies work group at : 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/nationalconversation/work groups.html
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First receivers typically include personnel in the following roles: clinicians and other hospital staff who 
have a role in receiving and treating contaminated victims (e.g., triage, decontamination, medical 
treatment and handling their clothing or personal effects) (OSHA 2007). First receivers often are the first 
to provide care to victims and those otherwise affected by a chemical emergency following initial field- 
based care that has been provided by the first responder personnel5.
OSHA has specific requirements for what the agency refers to as skilled support personnel. The agency 
defines this group as “Personnel, not necessarily an employer’s own employees, who are skilled in the 
operation o f certain equipment, such as mechanized earth moving or digging equipment or crane and 
hoisting equipment, and who are needed temporarily to perform immediate emergency support work that 
cannot reasonably be performed in a timely fashion by an employer’s own employees, and who will be or 
may be exposed to the hazards at an emergency response scene . . .”6
A system can be generally defined as a group o f interacting, interrelated or independent elements that 
form a complex whole. For the purposes o f the work o f this work group, a chemical emergency system in 
general has parts spread across the federal, state and local levels, depending upon the size and type o f the 
emergency, and involves the environmental, emergency management, public safety, and public health 
agencies o f the three levels o f government. In addition, industry has a very important role to play in 
preparing for and responding to emergencies (EPA 2010). Such a system is composed of, but not limited 
to, the following elements:
• One or more identified chemicals with toxic or other undesirable properties
• A source o f the chemical(s)
• Method(s) for transporting the chemical(s)
• Facilities for storing the chemical(s)
• Plan(s) for containing an accidental spill or discharge
• Appropriate equipment for cleaning up (containment and recovery) an accidental discharge
• Standards for certifying that an accidental discharge has been contained and recovered or 
removed
• Facilities for storing and disposing o f contaminated items (environmental or synthetic)
• Resources to control, coordinate and finance all emergency operations
• Health care
• Appropriate personnel
The term community, as defined by the work group, includes, but is not limited to, those groups that are 
typically formed by artificial boundaries such as zip codes or political subdivisions. The term also 
includes communities o f interest that may share a common interest or focus. When things go wrong, those 
affected create an ad-hoc community. Their shared focus is the accidental chemical discharge; their 
common interest is protecting people’s health and returning the affected region to the status quo that 
existed prior to the emergency (remediating).
5 Empirical observations in actual events suggest that the majority o f victims (especially in multiple casualty chemical 
emergencies and disasters) self-transport to the closest hospitals, without having received any care from first responders. See A uf 
der Heide and Duckett, 1989.
6 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (q) (4), (2010).
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9765.
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For the purposes o f this report, industry includes, but is not limited to, manufacturers, processors, 
transporters, and producers, and includes those industries involved in the production o f petrochemicals, 
agrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, polymers, paints, oleochemicals, and other chemical products.
Green chem istry can be defined as chemical research and engineering that encourages the design of 
products and processes that minimize the use and generation o f hazardous substances.
A vulnerable population, as discussed in this document, includes those with functional or developmental 
needs, disabilities, and activity limitations (FEMA 2010). It also includes those who are made vulnerable 
by their financial circumstances or place o f residence, health, age (e.g., children and seniors), personal 
characteristics, ability to communicate effectively, or presence o f chronic illness (President’s Advisory 
Commission 1998).
II. CURRENT STATUS OF ISSUES UNDER CONSIDERATION
a. Training and Capacity Building
All response agencies have one thing in common: they have dedicated men and women who answer the 
call when things go wrong. Whether first responders are paid or volunteer, the drive to help those in need 
is a trait possessed by all. Across agencies, first responders have the desire and the ability to be trained 
and learn the skills necessary to recognize and respond to chemical emergencies. As the number o f public 
health emergencies has increased, training has become very broad and not well integrated. As a result, 
critical first responders are handling chemical emergencies without adequate training.
Chemical Emergency Training
In order to improve chemical emergency response training, there are three main areas to address: a) 
access to training; b) consistency o f the types and levels o f training; and c) coherent local, state, tribal, 
and federal competency standards for responding to chemical emergencies.
There is a discrepancy in access to training between the career and volunteer fire service, as well as 
between different law enforcement agencies and EMS departments due to the availability o f both time 
and money. Large metropolitan areas have more resources and thus greater access to training compared to 
rural fire service forces, law enforcement agencies, and EMS departments. Fire service within rural areas 
and small towns primarily consists o f volunteers; some law enforcement agencies and EMS departments 
may have personnel who are either volunteer or part time workers. Volunteer fire services, rural law 
enforcement agencies, and rural EMS departments do not always have the financial resources to support 
training; moreover, as their volunteers or employees often work other jobs, they may not be able to take 
time off to do extensive training.
There are three levels o f chemical emergency response training, which are geared to different job 
functions: the awareness, operational, and technician levels.
Awareness Level: At a minimum, all first responders - including all fire, law enforcement, and EMS 
personnel - need to be trained to a HAZMAT awareness level. (Ideally, these personnel would be trained 
to the HAZMAT operational level so that they could act to reduce the impact o f a chemical emergency.) 
The International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA) states in “Hazardous Materials, Managing 
the Incident” (3rd ed.), that first responders at the awareness level are those individuals who are likely to 
witness or discover a hazardous substance release and who have been trained to initiate an emergency 
response notification process. The most common examples o f first responder-awareness level personnel 
are law enforcement and plant security personnel, as well as some public works employees.
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Operational Level: Most fire department suppression personnel fall into the first responder-operational 
level and are those individuals who respond to releases or potential releases o f hazardous substances as 
part o f the initial response for the purpose o f protecting nearby persons, property, or the environment 
from the effects o f the release. All firefighting personnel should be trained to the HAZMAT operational 
level. This training is for those personnel who have some protective equipment and other resources that 
would enable them to take further defensive actions at a hazardous materials scene.
Technician Level: Responders working on the scene in the contamination zone for the purpose of 
stopping the release need to be trained to the HAZMAT technician level, which includes the basic 
knowledge and skills to take appropriate offensive or defensive action requiring level A or level B 
personal protective equipment. This training needs to include monitoring for the hazardous material 
involved and knowledge o f action levels for materials.
Inconsistencies exist between federal and state regulations and enforcement o f training and capability 
requirements. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) have standards which cover employees with regard to chemical exposures and 
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) training standards. HAZMAT 
teams receive training, but are not licensed. First responder training is provided by multiple agencies, 
organizations and programs; however, there is no set o f consistent standards which addresses the core 
competencies for first responder activity during chemical emergencies. First responders do not have 
proper guidance as to what standards or protective levels to use during an incident. OSHA standards and 
EPA environmental standards were not developed for responding to chemical emergencies. There is a 
need for consistent training and national competency standards for responding to chemical emergencies.
In addition, there should be more options for performance-oriented training and competency 
development.
First responders may become involved in an incident before they realize a potential exposure hazard 
exists, and they may not have the proper training or resources to recognize and mitigate the presence of 
hazardous chemicals at a chemical emergency scene. When a chemical is not recognized or identified at 
the scene, contamination of responders, vehicles, equipment, and victims may carry through and 
contaminate the hospital emergency department, and in some cases, serious illness and injury, as well as 
death, can occur to exposed patients and responders. In areas where an incident overwhelms local support, 
the capacity to respond varies. Coordination o f HAZMAT team support may be dependent upon local 
funding as well as the support o f regional HAZMAT teams. There is a need to continuously foster 
cooperation and coordination between response agencies, jurisdictions and support agencies.
Skilled support personnel may not be readily available to assist with the response, and chemical 
emergencies may go on for hours before mitigation actions are undertaken. Capacity building should also 
include training o f first receivers and the community in HAZMAT awareness.
Hospitals currently plan and train for mass casualty events and need to be included in chemical 
emergency planning within their communities. Communication between first responders and health care 
providers should be strengthened so hospitals receive adequate warning o f chemical emergencies in order 
to prepare for the potential decontamination, triage, or treatment o f incoming patients. Emergency 
department staff, as well as clinic and all hospital staff, should have chemical hazard awareness-level 
training, with some key designated personnel receiving training to the operational level to facilitate safe 
and effective response and treatment.
The private sector should work with local emergency management agencies to help plan for response, as 
well as to address inconsistencies in communication and messaging during an event. In addition, the 
public needs to have an understanding o f the type o f response required during a chemical emergency and
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of the need for compliance with instructions from law enforcement, emergency managers, and public 
health officials during such an event.
While the fire service generally abides by stringent standards established by the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) and follows training guidelines set by organizations such as the International Fire 
Service Training Association (IFSTA) (Noll & Hildebrand 2005) and the Rural Domestic Preparedness 
Consortium (RDPC), the current training for firefighters is not federally regulated for content, 
competency testing, or certification. The only OSHA stipulation with regard to chemical emergency 
response training is that an individual involved in responding to a chemical emergency must have 
HAZWOPER training to the awareness level (29 C.F.R. § 1910.120). There are no uniform, nationwide 
criteria to define the required composition o f HAZMAT teams. Furthermore, there is no national 
certification process or licensing entity that oversees these groups.
At the state level, individual states have differing guidelines that suggest different competency levels. 
Some states inconsistently use Emergency Management Agency (EMA) guidelines for training their 
personnel, but again there is no requirement that the responders meet these guidelines. Most municipal 
employees and other groups that receive federal funds are required to undergo the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) training (at a minimum, NIMS training levels 100, 700 and 800). While this 
training is not incident-specific, it does contribute to overall incident management. The NIMS courses 
would qualify as an across-the-board type o f required training that most responding firefighters would 
probably have.
There are extensive training classes both online and in person throughout the country. These classes cover 
almost every eventuality that one could expect to see in a chemical incident. However, no single 
repository for cataloguing or evaluating available courses currently exists. There are no evaluation 
measures to determine a course’s ability to provide students with a certain level o f competency. Without a 
standardized curriculum or measurable target capabilities, training is unfocused. The variation in the 
quality o f training has resulted in inconsistent and inadequate training o f the workforce.
Furthermore, the level o f training and experience can vary greatly from organization to organization 
(urban vs. rural, large vs. small, professional vs. volunteer). A national certification program that 
establishes minimum qualifications for hazardous materials response should be offered to all first 
responders at no cost to the local entity. In addition, the nation’s em ergency response plan m ust 
include training in diagnosing and treating vulnerable populations’ exposures to  chemical 
em ergencies and spill events, including pesticide exposures. Any attempt to require such training 
and certification as an unfunded mandate, however, would only produce additional stress on already 
overextended public finances. As this national certification program will take some time and effort to 
develop, fund, and implement, it is recommended in the interim that emergency management departments 
ensure that training at the HAZWOPER awareness level is provided to all emergency responders. Key 
district or regional staff members should be required to receive training at the HAZWOPER operational 
level.
b. Systems and Coordination 
Barriers and Impediments
The success o f the U.S. chemical emergency response system is hampered by the following widespread 
impediments: organizations that are insular by nature, mission or past experience; interests and goals that 
are specific to particular organizations or types o f groupings (i.e., not held in common or shared); 
channels o f communication that are limited by custom, particular types of organizations and levels within
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those organizations; and personal factors such as ego, power, secrecy, and control that impede 
information-sharing at times when speed is essential. Additional barriers include 1) limited funding; 2) 
inadequate coordination; 3) insufficient laws; 4) insufficient communications systems; and 5) insufficient 
data.
1) Limited funding
In 1989, a phenomenon called the “paper” plan syndrome was identified (EPA 2008). This syndrome is 
described as the illusion o f preparedness based on written plans that are not tied to the funding and 
resources necessary to carry them out. Given that the acute chemical emergencies and disasters that cause 
injuries and illnesses are high-consequence but low-probability events, they compete for attention with 
the priorities o f everyday business. Often, getting the public, elected officials, and organizational leaders 
to support preparedness is just as difficult, if  not more so, than developing the countermeasures. Planning 
for low-probability events is typically plagued by the difficulty o f obtaining and maintaining sufficient 
funding.
Funding is clearly needed for preparedness, but one critical challenge is how to motivate policymakers to 
make sustainable funding available. For example, could chemical company insurance coverage be linked 
to prevention and preparedness standards? Could tax breaks be used to motivate preparedness? How can 
government funding o f preparedness be increased in the context o f the country’s ongoing economic crisis 
and reduced programs and budgets? These questions should be answered, but are beyond the scope o f the 
Chemical Emergencies work group. They are, however, amenable to empirical study and work group 
members support efforts to further explore them.
2) Inadequate Coordination
In 1984, in response to the Bhopal Disaster, there was a national effort to improve coordination of 
chemical responses, resulting in the passage o f the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) and the establishment o f state and Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). However, a 
2008 national survey o f LEPCs revealed that only 9% of LEPC members were very familiar with the 
emergency response plan, only 60.2% of these plans integrated with other applicable state plans, and only 
15.9% of LEPC members strongly agreed that their LEPC has had a positive impact on chemical safety in 
the community. In fact, o f the 2,670 LEPCs sent survey questionnaires, only 39.8% even returned them 
(Auf der Heide and Duckett 1989).
Clearly, there are several gaps in the coordination o f chemical emergency prevention, preparedness, and 
response. In addition to those mentioned above, significant gaps exist in jurisdictional responsibility and 
authority, real or perceived. Such gaps can be exacerbated by the complicated and confusing system of 
government agency responsibility for different aspects o f a chemical emergency. Moreover, local health 
departments (LHDs), the public, and many partners do not fully understand the LHD role in chemical 
emergencies. Finally, poor funding o f chemical emergency engagement contributes to a lack of 
communication and o f established capacity to communicate among LHDs and other relevant actors.
When preparing for and responding to a public health emergency, there are many different groups that 
state health agencies must work with to maximize the efficiency o f response and recovery efforts. State 
health agencies feel that coordination efforts should first focus on collaboration with the local health 
agencies, and then with the state environmental agencies. Given that local health agencies are “on the 
ground,” better in touch with what is happening in a specific community, and often the first to respond to 
an emergency, state agencies should prioritize coordination and training with the local health agencies. 
Once this training and relationship is well established, the state health agencies should then turn to 
bringing the state, tribal (where applicable), and local environmental agencies into the partnership and
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strengthening collaboration with them. This procedure will help build the network o f collaboration and 
communication needed to be effective. In cases where environmental health staff members are located in 
environmental agencies, the relationship between the health and environmental agencies should already 
be reinforced.
3) Insufficient Laws
Current major federal laws governing chemical emergencies generally cover cleanup, planning, response, 
and risk management, but do not explicitly encourage or require facilities to assess or use alternatives that 
could eliminate the danger o f a sudden chemical release. As a result, many communities host chemical 
hazards that may be simply unnecessary.
• The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act o f 1980 
(CERCLA) and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act o f 1986 (SARA) address 
cleaning up after chemical emergencies.
• The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act o f 1986 (EPCRA), a freestanding 
title o f SARA, addresses preparing fo r  spills or emergencies, primarily through LEPCs and by 
communicating chemical hazards to emergency responders and the public. The OSHA Hazard 
Communication Standard informs workers o f chemical hazards in the workplace.
• The Clean Air Act o f 1990 includes Risk Management Planning (RMP) requirements that address 
managing the risks o f  emergencies, as do the Process Safety Management (PSM) standards o f the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
• On April 9, 2007, the U.S. Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Chemical Facility 
Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). The CFATS require high-risk facilities to conduct a security 
vulnerability assessment (SVA) and then develop and implement a site security plan (SSP), which 
entails implementing site-specific security measures that meet the Risk-Based Performance 
Standards (RBPS) that the Department identified in the interim final rule.
None o f these laws regulate the vulnerability zones that chemical facilities present to surrounding 
communities in terms o f distance, chemical intensity, or population at risk. At this time, these laws do not 
require companies to assess safer and more secure alternatives that can reduce or eliminate many existing 
chemical hazards.7 The CFATS reauthorization currently pending congressional approval contains some 
language requiring companies to document that they have considered safer, more secure options. Should 
this requirement be passed, it could have a positive impact on chemical safety; however, it is encountering 
significant resistance and may not pass.
4) Insufficient Communication Systems and Strategies
Inadequate communication is also a significant barrier to effective chemical emergency preparedness and 
response. Improving communication would involve establishing formal channels as well as promoting 
informal channels o f communication. Communications should not only be restricted to organizational
7 Some other laws have additional impact on chemical emergencies: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
includes limited requirements for hazardous waste sites to “prevent the unknowing entry, and minimize the possibility for the 
unauthorized entry, o f persons or livestock... .”40 C.F.R. §§ 264.14, 265.14 (2010). The Toxic Substances Control A ct (TSCA) 
Section 6 gives EPA broad power to control any chemical that poses an “unreasonable risk o f injury to health or the 
environment.” 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b) (2010). This standard is cumbersome and ineffective in practice. The Pollution Prevention 
A ct (PPA) makes it the national policy o f the United States to reduce toxic waste at the source wherever feasible. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
13101-13109 (2010). This law also directs the EPA to consider how agency actions affect source reduction o f toxic waste.
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peers, but should also involve individuals with the knowledge or experience needed to address particular 
problems. Formal channels are well-defined but require time for messages to move through them.
Informal channels are very efficient and move quickly, and often integrate professionals at all levels o f 
organizations, although they sometimes proceed without regard to established positions and roles.
5) Insufficient Data
Successful planning depends on the incorporation o f appropriate measures into national and regional 
development planning. Its effectiveness will also depend on the availability o f information on hazards, 
emergency risks, and countermeasures. Barriers to achieving the vision o f a successful system include:
• The lack o f a single repository or clearinghouse o f information for planners, first responders, first 
receivers, or the community
• Little data for evidence-based planning
• Less funding to do chemical emergency planning than other types o f planning (e.g., infectious 
disease)
• The fact that not all industries are covered by existing planning and hazard mitigation laws 
(RMP/PSM/CFATS)
It is impossible to be well-prepared for a chemical emergency or to avert one altogether when there is a 
lack o f data to help determine the risks and best practices. While EPA, the Department o f Transportation 
(DOT), the Department o f Health and Human Services (HHS), DHS, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), 
and others do currently have some programs that attempt to collect these data, much more is needed.
More importantly, there is a need for coordination among the agencies. Disjointed activities serving each 
agency's own mission would much better serve the public if  they were coordinated.
Specific data needs include:
• Green chemistry research is needed and is currently gravely underfunded. A green chemistry 
approach to chemical emergencies should systematically generate solutions through the 
assessment and development o f technological options that reduce or remove chemical hazards. 
This approach should not only promote expertise in government, industry, academia, and other 
communities o f interest, but should also tap existing expertise through systematic review of and 
communication about safer alternatives.
• A  scientific f ie ld  research program  to study actual chemical emergency hazards and responses 
and provide an evidence-base for best practices for prevention, planning, comprehensive training, 
and coordination is sorely needed. While there are some steps in this direction, such as the 
ATSDR Assessment o f Chemical Exposures (ACE) program, which draws on different expertise 
and tools within ATSDR and CDC to lend assistance when there is a chemical emergency 
affecting a large number o f people, more is needed.
• Incident data are needed as it is impossible to know what to prepare for when there is a lack of 
complete data on what chemical emergencies are occurring. There are disparate systems that are 
not working in a coordinated fashion, including the National Response Center (NRC) Incident 
Reporting System; American Association o f Poison Centers (AAPC) National Poison Data 
System (NPDS); ATSDR National Toxic Substance Incidents Program (NTSIP) state surveillance 
system (severely cut back in recent years); the NIOSH Sentinel Events Notification System for 
Occupational Risk (SENSOR); the Department o f Transportation Hazardous Materials 
Information System (HMIS); the EPA Risk Management Plan (RMP) five-year accident history;
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EPA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program data; and states’ spill reporting systems. There are 
many lessons to be learned from these data, yet these systems are not maximally interacting and 
coordinating.
When the CSB was created, it was tasked with creating an incident database that may need 
regulation to require reporting. The CSB placed an advanced notice o f proposed rulemaking in 
the Federal Register in 2009, soliciting feedback on a regulation requiring accidental chemical 
releases to be reported to the CSB or to the National Response Center. While this comment 
period closed on August 4, 2009, to date CSB has not yet announced any intention to proceed. 
NTSIP does make an attempt to reconcile the disparate spill data and to gather complete and 
accurate date on chemical incidents. Yet its support has been severely cut in recent years and it 
can only collect accurate data for the seven states funded by ATSDR. NTSIP attempts to estimate 
national data by forging data sharing arrangements with other agencies. This estimating activity is 
also limited to those agencies wishing to share their data.
• Commodity flo w  data, or materials accounting data, on what is being stored, used, manufactured, 
or transported for every locality is needed to fully understand what the risks are, what to plan for, 
and how to eliminate exposure risks when feasible. For example, local emergency responders 
who would respond to a leak, spill, or fire, have limited knowledge o f what is being transported 
by railroad companies through their communities. Railroad authorities argue that providing this 
information is a matter o f national security. The result is inadequate planning for potential 
hazardous materials derailments (Hunter 2010). While a community’s “Right to Know” is well 
established as a principle, it has in many instances effectively been rescinded under the guise of 
national security, confidential business information, or trade secrets. This issue is even more 
pronounced for vulnerable and overburdened populations.
Risk assessment data can inform policy and planning decisions on the prioritization o f funds and 
the focus o f training and research. Only by assuring a scientifically rigorous risk assessment 
process and the education o f policy and decision-makers regarding the use o f risk assessments 
(making decisions in the face o f uncertainty) will risk assessments play an important role.
Toxicological data on the health risks from acute exposure are still needed to inform immediate 
protective actions, medical countermeasures, safe clean-up measures, accurate risk 
communication, and a better understanding o f the potential long-term effects o f exposure.
Status o f Tribal Chemical Emergency Management
Federally-recognized tribes, as sovereign nations, have the authority to develop emergency management 
systems. Tribes may use a variety o f terms to describe their emergency management systems, such as 
LEPC (Local Emergency Planning Committee) or TERC (Tribal Emergency Response Commission).
Due to a lack o f capacity, however, some tribes have not yet been able to establish such systems. For 
federally-recognized tribes with reservation boundaries, jurisdiction does not reside with state, county, or 
local entities, and tribes should not be considered public entities, but rather sovereign nations. There are 
also tribes without reservation boundaries that have federal-recognition status. Additionally, individual 
tribal infrastructure varies. Some tribes have their own fire departments and police or other form of 
security, some tribes require services from adjacent entities, and some have tribal members who volunteer 
as first responders. It is also important to remember that each tribe is unique in its status o f working with 
the federal government. There are federally-recognized tribes, state-recognized tribes, and tribal groups 
who are seeking federal recognition. Regardless o f status, tribes are also negatively affected by the 
impediments and barriers highlighted above and need access to training and funding to increase their
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capacity and expertise in the emergency management arena. As has been discussed, there are 
opportunities to overcome system-wide impediments, and it is critical that any such efforts include 
consideration o f tribal concerns. Clear communication and coordination with tribes early and often would 
help to yield synergistic benefits and more effective chemical emergency preparedness and response 
efforts.
III. CEW G VISION OF A SUCCESSFUL SYSTEM
Four themes emerged from the work o f the Chemical Emergencies work group, and these themes are 
critical components o f any emergency preparedness and response system. These four themes — 
prevention, planning, comprehensive training, and coordination and integration — form the framework of 
the Chemical Emergencies work group’s vision o f a successful system, and the foundation for the 
recommendations which appear in Section IV.
Prevention
The CEWG envisions a system where the focus is first on the prevention o f chemical emergencies. A 
successful chemical emergencies response system would feature the use o f safer technologies, including 
green technology; strategic outreach and communication; and enhanced training for and coordination 
among government agencies, tribes, community residents, academia, industry, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and voluntary organizations active in disaster (VOADs) during all phases of 
emergency management; and adequate resources for all phases o f implementation.
For many industries, safer technologies can remove the possibility, or significantly reduce the potential 
scope, o f a chemical emergency. Yet these options frequently do not enter into the emergency 
management conversation. As a result o f a successful implementation o f the envisioned system, 
government, industry, tribes, and the public would be given the opportunity to suggest and be informed 
about affordable and practical ways to remove or reduce chemical hazards, especially where the scope of 
the hazard exceeds realistic forecasts o f emergency response system capacity to effectively protect 
people, property, and the environment. Agencies and organizations at all levels -  federal, state, local, 
tribal, workplace, community, industry, academic, and other non-governmental organizations -  would 
have reliable information and technical expertise about specific chemical hazards and alternative 
technologies that can remove those hazards.
Prevention includes assessing the risk, prioritizing actions, securing dangerous chemicals and finding 
safer alternatives to dangerous chemicals. Programs should assure the security o f dangerous chemicals by 
preventing accidental or intentional releases during manufacture, storage, transport, use and disposal. 
Security programs must collaborate with programs that support alternate technologies. These programs 
would complement one another by changing what can be changed and securing what cannot. Such 
collaboration would better identify the priority areas that need focused research for safer alternatives.
In this vision, all states would be covered by legislation similar to the Massachusetts Toxics Use 
Reduction Act (TURA), a law passed in 1989 to encourage a reduction in the amount o f toxics used and 
the amount o f toxic byproducts generated (TURA 1989). Toxics use reduction is the best method for 
protecting public health and the environment from hazardous pollutants. This method has decreased the 
risk o f major accidents from transportation and storage, protected workers from dangerous workplace 
exposures and created safer products. Furthermore, in a successful system there would be a federal 
counterpart to the Toxic Use Reduction Institute (TURI) that provides training, services and grants to 
reduce toxic chemical use and advance energy and water efficiency while enhancing the economic 
competitiveness o f businesses. As a result o f TURA and TURI, Texas Instruments Incorporated in
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Attleboro, Massachusetts reduced its reliance on trichloroethylene from 850 tons a year in 1985 to less 
than two tons. Other victories include eliminating over two million pounds o f anhydrous ammonia and 
cutting its use o f cyanide compounds from 35,000 pounds in 1996 to just 5,000 pounds in 2000, for which 
Texas Instruments received the Massachusetts Governor's Award for Excellence in Toxics Use Reduction 
(TURI 2009).
In a successful system, hazardous chemical facilities would develop knowledge and awareness o f the 
potential harm, feasibility, costs and savings, and advantages and disadvantages o f the best available 
technology options. The government would systematically compile and disseminate knowledge o f these 
options to foster a culture o f awareness o f prevention options. The choice o f technology determines the 
associated hazards. A robust examination o f prevention options would come first — before management, 
control, or response options that all too often prove insufficient in an emergency. Facilities that can 
remove or reduce chemical hazards not only reduce their own regulatory burden, but also reduce the 
burden on regulatory agencies and emergency response systems. Information on chemical hazards and 
alternatives would be effectively organized and managed to reduce the burden on data providers as well 
as data users. An outreach strategy would be developed and implemented in order to disseminate 
information and materials to vulnerable populations within the nation’s diverse communities.
Prevention must be implemented at the top o f the hierarchy — before risk management, engineering or 
administrative controls, or cleanup. Arguably, many o f the recommendations in this report could be costly 
to implement. However, if  implementation o f these recommendations leads to the prevention o f or early 
mitigation o f chemical emergencies, the result will be a decreased need for regulation and thus a 
reduction in the regulatory burden. Focusing on prevention also will likely lead to significant savings in 
health care costs. As such, aspects o f prevention should be incorporated throughout the cycle of 
prevention, planning, preparedness, response, and recovery. For example, the CSB is an independent 
agency that arrives after major incidents and makes recommendations to prevent similar events in the 
future. A successful system could call for inspections o f facilities and industries prior to an incident to 
identify high-risk facilities, potential problems that may lead to a chemical emergency, and potential 
solutions. Localities and tribal governments would actively consider the use o f zoning, fire codes, land 
use planning, and ordinances to mandate alternative assessments. Ideally, local agencies and tribes would 
develop a working relationship with industry to foster a partnered inspection program in an attempt to 
prevent chemical emergencies by identifying potential problems or issues and bringing them to the 
attention o f industry representatives. The federal government would provide funding for this partnership 
to local and tribal agencies, demonstrating a commitment to the prevention o f chemical emergencies. 
Finally, in order to prevent chemical emergencies, it is critical that all persons in all states have access to 
data that tracks chemical emergency incidents and measures where preparedness and response efforts 
have been successful. Planning, preparedness, response and recovery activities are especially needed, 
however, where a hazard cannot be prevented.
Planning
A successful system, from the Chemical Emergencies work group’s perspective, will ensure that all 
communities, including rural and tribal communities, have adequate resources and legal authority to 
complete thorough vulnerability analyses, promote chemical emergency hazard reduction, establish 
effective plans, and take immediate steps to mitigate any hazardous effects o f a chemical emergency. 
Planning forms the foundation for a community's long-term strategy to reduce chemical emergency losses 
and break the recurring cycle o f exposures. The planning process creates a framework for risk-based 
decision-making that reduces harm to lives, property, and the economy from future chemical 
emergencies.
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Hazard reduction is sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and their 
property from hazards, thereby creating safer communities and reducing loss o f life and property. 
Adopting zoning ordinances that steer chemical facility development away from populated areas, 
designing roads that carry traffic away from vulnerable areas, acquiring damaged homes or businesses in 
areas prone to chemical releases, and requiring businesses to switch to safer available alternative 
substances or processes are all examples o f chemical emergency planning strategies.
Ideally, all federal agencies engaged in chemical emergency planning, other government agencies, the 
private sector and NGOs/VOADs would unite to create and promote a central clearinghouse for planning 
(i.e., databases, regulations, and planning tools). A thorough review of all federal, state, and local statutes 
on chemical planning would also take place, followed by the creation o f model legislation that can be 
enacted at the federal, state, and tribal levels. Lastly, in a successful system, the planning bodies that exist 
(e.g., LEPCs) would all have the financial and informational resources needed to perform their jobs 
properly.
Comprehensive Training
“Once we have good plans in place, we must invest fa r  more in leadership training fo r  first responders. 
We must make sure that they have all the resources and practice they need. After that, we must unleash 
them to attack a crisis with fu ll force and authority. To paraphrase Winston Churchill in World War II, 
let us give them the tools they need so they can finish the job  (Gergen 2010). ”
The Chemical Emergencies work group envisions a system in which, if  preventative measures fail and a 
chemical emergency takes place, the roles and responsibilities o f those involved in chemical emergency 
management would be predetermined and clearly defined. Those charged with the response would be 
trained to a level that supports a successful response resulting in no deaths or injuries and completed with 
successful mitigation o f the hazards associated with the emergency. Simply put, responders and receivers 
would have the “tools they need so they can finish the job.” Lines o f communication, structures and 
procedures for collaboration among relevant local, state, tribal, and federal actors would be established 
prior to the chemical emergency. Effective coordination o f chemical emergency engagement would be 
accomplished because o f the increased amount and better quality o f training for relevant actors, especially 
emergency responders.
The 2010 Deep Water Horizon Gulf oil spill provides timely, salient examples o f why training is the 
foundation o f successful preparedness and response to chemical emergencies. One lesson learned from 
the Gulf oil spill response is that clear information and training must be provided and repeated for all 
contractors, clean-up workers and volunteers based on an analysis o f job tasks and potential exposure to 
oil waste and weathered by-products. This is particularly true for first receivers who, as this report has 
indicated, are often inadequately trained. Risk protection messages are most effective when they are 
delivered often and in close proximity to the occurrence o f targeted behavior.
Coordination and Integration
In the context both o f federalism and ever-increasing global inter-connectivity, effective coordination is 
more crucial than ever (Kouzoukas 2007). A successful system also would be a coordinated system, with 
little to no unnecessary fragmentation. There would be improved coordination and integration among 
different governmental jurisdictions, as well as across multiple sectors and disciplines (Moulton,
Gottfried, Goodman, and Murphy and Rawson 2003).
Under the current system, federal efforts for spill prevention and security o f chemical facilities include 
both regulation and collaborative initiatives. The chemical industry is subject to regulations addressing
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health, safety, accident prevention, emergency response, and the environment. Identifying high-risk 
chemicals and high-risk facilities as well as developing site security and emergency response plans are 
key components o f regulations such as the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Risk Management Program, the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Chemical 
Sector Specific Agency (SSA), within the U.S. Department o f Homeland Security’s Office of 
Infrastructure Protection, works with chemical industry trade associations to share best practices with the 
larger industry through a collaborative partnership, as outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan. The SSA has also partnered with private and public sector organizations to develop new prevention 
and preparedness programs, such as the Security Seminar & Exercise Series for Chemical Industry 
Stakeholders, National Level Exercises, and information-sharing tools that link critical facility 
information with their respective chemical inventories to first responders and emergency planners at the 
local, state and federal levels.
These efforts notwithstanding, existing government jurisdictions can be visualized as silos. Silos emerge 
as organizations expand in size, assume new responsibilities and become insular, resulting in a growing 
sense o f self-importance. Silos promote exclusivity among their members, allowing them to surround 
themselves with like-minded persons. This fosters familiarity but impedes progress in emergencies. 
Response efforts may require coordination across various silos and multiple levels, including local, state, 
tribal, and federal governments, and even international organizations.
Silos create barriers to communication. Reducing or eliminating silos would change organizational 
channels o f communication and accelerate sharing information and addressing problems. As barriers are 
eliminated, new channels o f communication should emerge. Communications should not be restricted to 
organizational peers, but should involve individuals with the knowledge or experience needed to address 
particular problems. Integrating people at different levels in a variety o f organizations enhances 
information exchange. An apt metaphor for the ideal scenario is that o f a crystal lattice where energy 
(communications) can flow easily and without barriers.
Coordination o f legal responses to chemical emergencies also may involve a horizontal dimension 
comprising numerous and diverse sectors, such as public health, environmental protection, emergency 
management, public and private health care, education, law enforcement, and the chemical industry 
(Moulton, Gottfried, Goodman, Murphy and Rawson 2003).
Lessons learned from the 2010 Gulf oil spill also underscore how critical coordination is to successful 
chemical emergency preparedness and response. Work group members active in the response noted that 
state and federal health and safety agencies need access to all oil response areas on water and land to 
assure the safety o f response workers. In order to assure safe operations while handling absorption booms 
and conducting skimming operations on the water, the U.S. Coast Guard must ensure that the right to 
entry in order to assure responder safety is not dependent on the responsible party and its contractors.
Successful coordination for chemical emergency preparedness and response also requires solid and 
established public- private relationships. For example, another key lesson learned from the Gulf oil spill is 
that the responsible party should establish, in conjunction with the Incident Commander, a comprehensive 
injury and illness reporting system to be collected by diverse sources and reported to government public 
health agencies in order to ensure full reporting o f ALL safety and health related issues experienced by 
cleanup workers. In this particular instance, British Petroleum (BP) and public health agencies should 
partner in establishing diagnostic criteria and population surveillance for all responders and not rely solely 
on contractors for diagnosis and reporting. In addition, collaborative processes should be established to 
share data among the responsible party and federal, state, and tribal health agencies. In a collaborative and 
transparent manner, they should gather, tabulate and analyze information related to exposure o f cleanup
Page 17 of 33
workers to oil, degreasers, and detergents. As part o f the current Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) process, the 
Incident Commander should require representative individual exposure monitoring o f critical job tasks 
during the time that cleanup workers are engaged in response tasks. In this way, the mechanisms of 
relaxing barriers (reducing silo structure) and encouraging open exchanges o f information (sanctioning 
informal channels o f communication) have the potential to speed up the recovery process.
IV. ACTION RECOM M ENDATIONS
RECOM M ENDATION #1: The federal governm ent should establish an office or program  whose 
goal would be to serve as a coordinating unit, unifying and integrating the efforts of federal, state, 
local, and triba l governm ent agencies, with responsibilities related to preventing, preparing  for, 
responding to, recovering from , and m itigating chemical emergencies, and serving as a central 
p rogram  charged with creating consistency and avoiding redundancy of inform ation on chemical 
emergencies on the national, state, local, and triba l levels.
Establishing an Office o f the Chemical Emergencies Coordinator could accomplish a variety o f goals. 
First, this office would integrate the often disparate data developed by federal agencies before, during, 
and after a chemical emergency, and proactively disseminate it to planners, responders, and, where 
appropriate, the public via a National Clearinghouse for Chemical Emergencies. Second, the work group 
envisions this office as having a role in community outreach and volunteer training on personal and 
community responsibilities as well as roles in chemical emergency prevention, preparedness and 
response. Third, much of the focus o f those agencies charged with this area o f work has been on 
catastrophic emergencies. This office would ensure that chemical emergency prevention, preparedness, 
and response are prioritized.
Ideally, this office would establish a National Clearinghouse for Chemical Emergencies. In part, the 
office should collect, develop and disseminate toxicological informational tools. The office would be 
charged with receiving reports o f chemical emergencies and guiding timely responses through referrals to 
the agencies with proper jurisdiction (for instance, through public health, first response, first receiver and 
Poison Control Center channels). In addition, this office would be responsible for ensuring that 
responders at all levels have access to real-time information on regional resources and response 
capabilities.
The recommended clearinghouse could emulate the national system of Poison Control Centers (PCCs), 
already partially funded by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Advantages of 
using the existing hotline structure for access include:
• Immediate access to medical toxicologists
• Availability o f specialists in poison information trained to collect exposure data (including the 
collection o f blood, urine, and other samples)
• Real-time response and staff trained in risk communications targeted at both the public and at 
professional audiences
• Alignment with academic resources
• Public and professional familiarity with the existing phone number and service
• Economies o f scale
• Robust regional knowledge o f response partners and public health agencies
A structure utilizing one or more regional PCCs might form the backbone o f the emergency reporting and 
response system under this office. The availability o f clinical toxicologists and other specialists may yield 
high-quality interpretation o f exposure data (often incomplete in the literature or requiring collection from
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several esoteric sources), provide real-time treatment recommendations for first responders and first 
receivers, and offer direct access to the system for the public and other professionals. PCC personnel 
routinely capture, record and report emergency events, exercises and drills, and engage in related public 
health notifications and risk communications. Mechanisms for raising awareness o f PCC services already 
exist, and a modest expansion in function and an increase in dedicated funding to allow one or more 
PCCs to adopt this important function would shorten turn-around time for the creation o f this office and 
to make it operational. Re-branding o f the PCCs should be advertised to the public, chemical industry and 
professionals. Moreover, contact data for the office and for the Poison Control system (1-800-222-1222) 
should be included on all Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and similar chemical datasheets. In 
addition, web searches o f terms such as “chemical emergency,” should yield this site among the first 
listed. The website should be easy to navigate and, if  additional assistance is needed, there should be the 
option to talk with a live operator.
Given that there are many potential actors involved with preventing, preparing for, responding to, 
recovering from, and mitigating chemical emergencies, with varying levels o f skill, education and 
training, it will be difficult to develop such a clearinghouse without a unifying body. Thus, this 
recommendation focuses first on the establishment o f an Office o f the Chemical Emergencies Coordinator 
whose goal would be to coordinate and integrate the efforts o f all relevant federal government agencies.
In addition, there are multiple local, state, tribal, and federal agencies and NGOs that have the resources 
and expertise to assist communities and industries during a chemical release. Another goal o f this office 
would be to establish outreach and volunteer training programs to promote and support individual and 
community preparedness (e.g., public education, training sessions, and demonstrations), including 
preparedness o f those with functional needs. The creation o f this office would provide agencies and 
NGOs with a centralized location to report their activities and programs, which would serve to avoid 
duplication o f efforts and to update stakeholders. A comprehensive, easily accessible website should also 
be established for this service, with an eye toward providing ongoing education on chemical releases and 
their prevention.
The Department o f Health and Human Services (DHHS), in coordination with the Department of 
Homeland Security, the National Response Center, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Commission on Children and Disasters, and other appropriate 
agencies, should be considered as key resources during the establishment o f this office. The office may 
draw upon other resources, such as medical toxicologists, clinical toxicologists, or basic science 
toxicologists (available through organizations such as the American College o f Medical Toxicologists, the 
American Academy of Clinical Toxicology, the American Association o f Poison Control Centers, and the 
Society o f Toxicology); the chemical industry; industrial hygienists; academia; ATSDR; OSHA; NIOSH; 
and EPA.
Although establishment o f the Office o f the Chemical Emergencies Coordinator could be led by DHHS, it 
might be more effective if  it is established as an independent entity, and not under the ownership or 
control o f any one agency. In addition, the Office o f the Chemical Emergencies Coordinator should be 
free from political influence, with major funding coming either from a pool o f contributions by all 
relevant federal agencies or from funding triggered by a federal emergency declaration.
RECOM M ENDATION #2: Federal governm ent agencies with responsibilities for providing 
applied research funding and other funding to tribes and state and local governm ent agencies on 
chemical emergencies should require th a t relevant funding announcem ents include language 
strongly encouraging the development of partnersh ips with non-governm ental organizations 
(NGOs) and comm unity-based organizations, academ ia, labor unions, and industry.
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Partnerships are an important tool in preventing, preparing for and responding to chemical exposures. To 
quote the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, “NGOs, such as community-based, faith-based, or 
national organizations, play vital roles in emergency management and incident response activities. NGOs 
that have the capacity and desire to be involved should be fully integrated into a jurisdiction’s 
preparedness efforts, especially in planning, training, and exercises. Furthermore, a memorandum of 
agreement should be established with each NGO prior to an incident so that each organization is aware of 
the capabilities, expectations, and roles o f others (Institute for Homeland Security Solutions 2005).”
Academia is a highly untapped resource in chemical emergency preparedness and response. The resources 
that academia brings to the table are highly trained people with expertise in chemistry, public health, 
environmental health, engineering, emergency management, biology, etc. Similarly, industry often has 
extensive knowledge o f particular chemicals (either individual molecules or classes o f compounds), 
employees with high levels o f expertise and modern (state-of-the art and frequently expensive) 
equipment. Partnerships must be balanced; each partner must gain from any alliance, and a win-win 
situation must be established.
Optimally, partnerships with industry will focus at least in part on encouraging the use o f safer 
alternatives and green chemistry technologies with the goal o f preventing chemical emergencies. Ideally, 
these partnerships will lead to information-sharing on processes and technologies that can remove major 
chemical hazards.
Where appropriate, proposals for funding that include representatives from industry, academia, and 
community organizations/NGOs as co-equal partners should be encouraged and incentivized, and should 
receive priority for acceptance and funding. Roles and responsibilities should be shared and clearly 
delineated to avoid enlisting and creating participants in name only. Proposals that include more than one 
institution or industry partner (again, as co-equal partners) should receive bonus points during the review 
process. External auditors (one each from the funding source and recipient institutions) should annually 
review the structure, operating efficiency and results o f any partnerships created as a result o f grant- 
related activities. If  recipients are found to be non-compliant with the terms o f this recommendation, 
funding may be reduced or withheld.
RECOM M ENDATION #3: A Presidential Executive O rder or Hom eland Security Presidential 
Directive should be established th a t calls for the development of an overarching national vision for 
chemical emergencies and for each federal agency to develop its own supporting strategy for 
preventing, preparing  for, responding to, recovering from , and m itigating chemical emergencies, 
and ensuring th a t preparedness m omentum  is m aintained.
An executive order would be a legally binding order given by the president, acting as the head o f the 
executive branch, to the federal administrative agencies. Homeland Security Presidential Directives are 
issued by the president on matters pertaining to homeland security.
Successful implementation o f this recommendation will require a commitment by all federal agencies and 
will indicate a significant paradigm shift. Such a commitment affects all programs and activities involving 
chemicals. The outcomes created from its implementation should more than justify the investment o f time 
and commitment to government preparedness and response to chemical emergencies across all agencies 
and levels o f government.
This executive order or directive would apply to all agencies and would include the creation o f an 
Interagency Working Group on Chemical Emergencies (Working Group). The Working Group should be 
formed within three months o f the date o f the order and will be responsible for developing a common and 
shared overarching vision to help guide the agencies as they develop agency-specific strategies.
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The administrators o f the EPA and DHHS or their designees shall convene the Working Group on 
Chemical Emergencies. The Working Group shall be comprised o f the heads o f the following executive 
agencies and offices or their designees: the Department o f Defense; the Department o f Health and Human 
Services; the Department o f Housing and Urban Development; the Department o f Labor; the Department 
of Agriculture; the Department o f Transportation; the Department o f Justice; the Department o f the 
Interior; the Department o f Commerce; the Department o f Energy; the Environmental Protection Agency; 
the Department o f Homeland Security (to include the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Coast 
Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, the Science and Technology Directorate, the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection, and the Office o f Health Affairs); the Office o f Management and Budget; the 
Office o f Science and Technology Policy; Office o f the Deputy Assistant to the President for 
Environmental Policy; and such other government officials as the president may designate. The Working 
Group shall report to the president through the deputy assistant to the president for environmental policy.
Ideally, the Working Group will collaborate with the federal Office o f Chemical Emergencies 
Coordinator, discussed in recommendation #1, to (1) coordinate with, provide guidance to, and serve as a 
clearinghouse for each federal agency as it develops a chemical emergencies strategy in order to ensure 
that the administration, interpretation and enforcement o f programs, activities and policies are undertaken 
in a consistent manner; (2) assist in coordinating research by and stimulating cooperation among the EPA, 
DHHS, the Department o f Education, and other agencies conducting research or other activities related to 
chemical emergencies; (3) assist in developing sources o f information on safer chemicals and 
coordinating data collection; (4) examine existing data and studies on chemical emergencies; and (5) 
develop interagency model projects on chemical emergencies that demonstrate cooperation among federal 
agencies.
This recommendation might also lead to the establishment o f a National Chemical Emergencies 
Awareness Day.
RECOM M ENDATION #4: ATSDR and its p a rtn e r agencies should establish a collaborative 
program  th a t prom otes the capacity across governm ent agencies, industry, and academ ia for the 
development of technical and policy expertise in green technologies th a t remove or reduce the 
possibility of a significant chemical emergency.
The principle o f eliminating or vastly reducing chemical hazards is inherent in the theories supporting 
green chemistry. “Green chemistry” is a broad term with many definitions. As defined by the EPA, green 
chemistry, also known as sustainable chemistry, is the design o f chemical products and processes that 
reduce or eliminate the use or generation o f hazardous substances, thus preventing a chemical emergency 
from occurring. Green chemistry should be applied across the entire life cycle o f a chemical product, 
including its design, manufacture, use and disposal. The green chemistry movement seeks to align 
science, the environment, and economics to create more innovative, efficient and safer product and 
business designs. Industry should be provided regulatory incentives to assess, use, and develop such 
technologies.
EPA, through its Green Chemistry Program, should expand its funding program to provide research 
grants for resolving practical problems in the implementation o f technologies that design out the potential 
for a chemical emergency. Security programs must collaborate with programs that support alternate 
technologies. These programs would complement one another by changing what can be changed and 
securing what cannot. Such collaboration would better identify the priority areas that need focused 
research for safer alternatives. Collaboration between security and alternative technology programs 
would be complementary by changing what can be changed and securing what cannot. Such collaboration 
would better identify the priority areas that need focused research for safer alternatives. This collaborative
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program should work in coordination with other programs to ensure the security o f dangerous chemicals 
during manufacture, storage, transport, use, and disposal. Federal agencies should develop program 
coordination for the promotion o f green technologies, including dedicated expertise in engineering, 
policy, and alternatives assessment. The results o f any related research should be made available through 
the clearinghouse discussed in recommendation #1.
RECOM M ENDATION #5: ATSDR, in collaboration with other federal governm ent agencies, 
should develop an ongoing national program  to assess and improve the health care response to 
hazardous chemical releases, and to develop an evidence base for chemical emergency planning.
One o f ATSDR’s missions is to prevent exposure and adverse health effects from unplanned releases o f 
hazardous substances. In order to achieve this mission, ATSDR educates physicians and other health care 
providers and provides technical support and advice to other federal agencies, states, and local and tribal 
governments that respond to hazardous chemical releases. Hospital preparedness programs include 
planning for mass casualty events and decontamination. In many communities, public health agencies, 
EMS, local emergency management agencies, law enforcement, and other responders are engaging in 
ongoing health care preparedness planning. An important component o f hospital preparedness is 
undertaking training and practice exercises as part o f any hospital preparedness plans that are developed. 
Efforts toward preparing the health care sector for chemical and other emergencies take place on the 
federal level and, in theory, are funneled down to local public health agencies and hospitals. As such, 
hospital preparedness programs should be integrated with state, tribal, local planning and capacity­
building protocols for response to chemical emergency events.
The passage o f SARA Title III and the Nunn-Lugar Anti-Terrorism Act reflect increasing concern in 
recent decades about the country’s preparedness to manage adverse health effects due to hazardous 
chemical incidents. Unfortunately, there is a lack o f empirical studies that would allow for the evaluation 
o f the country’s current levels o f preparedness or guide the establishment o f effective preparedness 
programs. Limited data suggest that the level o f preparedness is not adequate. Since planning is only as 
good as the assumptions on which it is based, it is important that planning assumptions are correct.
To address this deficiency, ATSDR should work with its partners to 1) develop an ongoing national 
program that includes the following elements and 2) provide the necessary funding to make it 
sustainable8:
1. Establishment o f a regularly updated national collection o f published and unpublished documents, 
reports, and research papers on the responses to chemical emergencies and the lessons learned 
from them, which would be made available to planners, policymakers, practitioners, and the 
public. This collection closely relates to the clearinghouse mentioned in Recommendation #1.
2. Establishment o f a standing national rapid-response field chemical emergency research team that 
would mobilize quickly to gather data on the operational lessons learned and best practices from 
responses to chemical emergencies. This can occur in conjunction with the ATSDR Assessment 
o f Chemical Exposures (ACE) program teams that collect data on chemical emergency exposures 
and both short- and long-term outcomes. It is important to collect information from multiple 
events to identify common trends and patterns and to generate a large enough sampling for 
analysis.
3. Utilization o f the data from points #1 and #2 above to establish evidence-based criteria for 
effective chemical emergency preparedness that can be housed in a clearinghouse, such as the one 
proposed in recommendation #1.
8Note that these elements could be extrapolated to all-hazards preparedness as well.
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4. Regular national randomized surveys o f chemical response organizations and institutions to 
assess their levels o f preparedness using the criteria from point #3. (One might consider this a 
national “preparedness surveillance system.”)
5. Funding to establish additional NTSIP states and promote the sharing o f existing chemical 
emergency incident data. Without an understanding o f the chemical emergencies that are 
occurring and their effects, it is impossible to effectively plan for a chemical emergency. The 
types o f surveillance data collected on chemical emergencies also need to be expanded.
6. The development o f recommendations for chemical emergency/disaster preparedness that are 
based on information generated from the above elements. These can be included in training 
materials for first responders and receivers.
RECOM M ENDATION #6: Congress should pass a law requiring facilities to assess, and in certain 
cases, to implement safer and m ore secure alternatives th a t can reduce or eliminate the possibility 
of toxic gas releases. 9
This report has recognized that while there are laws addressing risk management preparedness and 
response, there are no federal laws addressing the primary prevention o f chemical emergencies. Such a 
law should establish policies, resources, and practices that encourage and develop the use o f safer, more 
secure technologies. In following this approach, hazardous chemical facilities should evaluate and 
document the site-specific technological and economic feasibility of relevant options. These assessments 
will inform a hazard reduction program that encourages innovation and investment in safer technologies 
as a means not only to protect people, property, and the environment, but also to obviate the need for 
certain chemical safety and security regulation at specific facilities. The House o f Representatives has 
acted to fill this gap in federal law by passing H.R. 2868, the Chemical and W ater Security Act of 
2009.10 The act would require facilities to assess, and in certain cases, to implement safer and more 
secure alternatives that can reduce or eliminate the possibility o f an acute release o f toxic inhalable 
gases.11 The legislation authorizes funds for implementation. It assigns authority over private sector 
facilities to DHS under the existing Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard. It assigns EPA authority 
over drinking water facilities under the Safe Drinking Water Act and over wastewater facilities under 
the Clean W ater Act. For this legislation to be implemented successfully, it will require cooperation 
between these and other agencies as well as the development o f relevant expertise.
The only certain way to protect our communities is to remove the possibility o f a toxic gas release by 
converting facilities to safer, more secure alternative technologies. Such approaches employ innovation 
and adaptation as well as many existing technologies. For example, bleach plants can reduce the danger to 
employees and surrounding populations by generating chlorine on-site without rail shipment and bulk 
storage. Many drinking water utilities have converted from chlorine gas to liquid bleach. Many 
wastewater utilities have converted chlorine gas and/or sulfur dioxide gas to liquid bleach and/or sodium 
bisulfite, or to ultraviolet light. Developing commercial-scale solid acid catalyst alkylation methods 
could provide a new generation o f refinery technology. Primary prevention approaches should reduce the 
number o f people potentially exposed to acute toxic gases releases by, for example, using alternate 
chemicals or processes, using chemicals in less dangerous forms, or generating chemicals only as needed 
and without storage. Additional methods should be used to reduce the probability o f release and/or to 
reduce the toxicity o f the material that would potentially be released.
9 Work group members Derek Swick of the American Petroleum Institute and Clark Phinney o f Maine Oxy do not support 
recommendation #6.
10 As o f the writing o f this report, HR 2868 has passed the House, but not the Senate.
11 Under HR 2868, only the highest-risk facilities can be required to implement safer technologies, or some two percent o f the 
highest-risk facilities. W here such alternatives are feasible, even the highest-risk facility is permitted the flexibility to apply other 
measures, or “layers o f protection” to the process.
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Although primary prevention will not be possible in every case and some risks will always need to be 
managed, prepared for and responded to, the above examples o f existing technologies indicate that there 
are many opportunities for primary prevention that have not yet been realized. A law requiring the 
assessment o f opportunities for, and, in some cases, the implementation o f safer technologies will lead to 
significant risk reduction.
RECOM M ENDATION #7: The EPA, OSHA, Consum er Product Safety Commission (CPSC), 
DOT, and the U.S. Coast G uard  should be m andated by law to follow the United N ations’ (UN) 
Globally Harm onized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS) safety data sheet 
(SDS12) form at and content requirem ents for providing inform ation on chemicals.
Requirements for providing information about the hazards o f chemicals and their safe use and handling 
are inconsistent among agencies, both domestically and internationally. The diverse and sometimes 
conflicting domestic and international requirements can create confusion among those who seek to use 
hazard information. SDSs may include symbols and hazard statements that are unfamiliar to readers or 
not well understood, and information may not be easy to find. In chemical emergencies, easy access to 
information that is readily understandable is a critical response factor.
The GHS is a common and coherent approach to defining and classifying hazards and to communicating 
information on labels and SDSs. To address the needs o f the diverse audiences for SDSs, a standardized 
format was seen as a way to make the information on SDSs easier for users to find, to segregate technical 
sections o f the document from more basic elements, to facilitate computerized data retrieval systems, and 
to simplify training for those who use SDSs. The GHS establishes a sixteen-section SDS format for 
presenting information with standardized headings. In the recommended GHS SDS format, the 
information o f greatest concern to emergency responders is featured at the beginning o f the SDS, 
including information on composition, fire-fighting and accidental release measures.
The GHS is in the process o f being implemented globally and domestically.13 The European Union has 
adopted all o f the GHS classifications, including ecotoxicity, and the United States should do the same. 
DOT has essentially implemented the necessary changes to align with the GHS, and OSHA has published 
a Notice o f Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to align its current Hazard Communication Standard with the 
GHS. However, EPA and CPSC are not making progress in implementing the GHS, and the Coast 
Guard’s support o f the International Maritime Organization (IMO) SDS format and content is not 
consistent with the harmonized, UN-endorsed GHS SDS. These Coast Guard activities will impede 
emergency response to affected cargoes carried in international waters (i.e., International Convention for 
the Prevention o f Pollution from Ships [MARPOL] Annex I cargoes and marine fuel oils) because 
conflicting and non-harmonized hazard communication information will be provided to SDS users, 
including chemical emergency response personnel. Coordination among agencies in the adoption o f the 
GHS should be improved. One agency should be designated the lead agency for this purpose.
In practice, collaboration is needed with the Canadian authorities, including Health Canada (Workplace 
Hazardous Materials Information System [WHMIS]/SDSs, pesticides, and consumer products) and 
Transport Canada. Canada has similar hazard communication/SDS systems and conflicting requirements, 
yet it is in the process o f implementing the GHS.
12 Safety Data Sheets (SDS) is the international designation, as well as the terminology used in the GHS field, for what is often 
referred to as Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) in the U.S.
13 Note that the U.S. approach to hazard communication and the UN GHS framework do not require the generation of hazard 
information on chemicals. All classification decisions are based only on available data. Thus, it is also important to support 
more research and pursue the compilation o f more comprehensive data on chemicals.
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A uniform domestic SDS format is needed to ensure emergency response personnel and community 
members have complete and consistent access to information on chemical exposures and hazards. To 
accomplish domestic harmonization o f the SDS requirements:
1. Agencies need to have adequate resources/funding to accomplish the consistent adoption o f the 
GHS. Agencies also need adequate resources/funding to ensure industry compliance with SDS 
requirements.
2. With regard to the timeline, the implementation could be phased in over a three-to-five-year 
transition period. Either the GHS or domestic hazard communication/SDS requirements could be 
used during the transition period, and then the GHS requirements would be mandated.
3. OSHA should work closely with other government agencies to ensure consistent and timely 
implementation o f the GHS and alignment to the UN-endorsed version o f the GHS.
4. Within three years, EPA should align the SDS requirements in Title III o f the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA, also known as the Emergency Response and 
Community Right-to-Know Act o f 1986) with the OSHA/UN endorsed version o f the GHS. This 
effort would harmonize SDSs made available to state emergency response commissions, local 
emergency planning committees, and fire departments in order to assist in planning and response 
to emergencies, as well as provide members o f the public with information about chemicals used 
in their communities.
5. Within three years, EPA should align the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) hazard communication requirements with the UN-endorsed version o f the GHS as far as 
is feasible.
6. The recent International Maritime Organization (IMO)/Coast Guard activities related to SDSs do 
not promote global harmonization and a consistent SDS format. Within three years, the Coast 
Guard should align its SDS requirements for MARPOL Annex I cargoes and marine fuel oils 
with the OSHA/UN-endorsed version o f the GHS.
7. Within three years, CPSC should align its hazard communication requirements with the UN­
endorsed version o f the GHS as far as is feasible.
RECOM M ENDATION #8: All first responder and first receiver organizations should be provided 
with a core competency curriculum  of tra in ing  on basic chemical emergency response, 
communication and coordination of the prevention, planning, response and recovery phases to 
ensure th a t there  is a common foundation on which all fu rther tra in ing  can be based.
All first responders, including, but not limited to, fire service (both career and volunteer), law 
enforcement and emergency medical services personnel, and first receiver organizations should possess a 
basic core knowledge and competency in responding to chemical emergencies. Training should include 
HAZMAT response, terminology, communication and incident command structure to optimize both their 
response capability and responder/receiver safety.
The Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department o f Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) are best suited for this as both agencies already provide multiple trainings either directly or 
through funded/contracted third parties to the target receiver and responder populations. The work group 
recommends a model similar to that used to train individuals on the concepts o f Incident Command 
System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The country needs a series of 
successive and interrelated trainings, delivered through existing training providers and funded by federal 
agencies, including DHS and DHHS, that all build upon each other to strengthen capacity related to 
chemical emergency event planning, response and clean up. Existing training partners, such as the 
International Fire Safety and Training Association (IFTSA) and the Rural Domestic Preparedness 
Consortium (RDPC), are ideal resources for the development and delivery o f training.
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The Emergency Management Institute (EMI), coordinated by FEMA, already provides multiple self-study 
courses and would be an ideal delivery mechanism. FEMA has developed Target Capability Lists (TCL) 
to define the essential tasks for response areas, including hazmat response. Coordination o f the TCL, core 
curriculum and training courses could help to build a better prepared response workforce. Building on 
this work, measures o f competency should be developed for essential aspects o f the core curriculum. 
These measures should be applied at multiple levels, including individual, team and community levels. In 
addition, decision support tools for responders to use during an event, along with just-in-time training for 
rapid dissemination at the time o f the event, should all be aligned with the core curriculum. A 
clearinghouse o f training courses with an evaluation o f their intended audience, core competencies 
covered, and previous attendees’ feedback should be readily available for potential students or agencies 
seeking specific training.
The Chemical Emergencies work group strongly encourages FEMA to expand the community education 
offerings already a part o f the EMI training to include chemical awareness and basic emergency response 
topics geared toward community members and the public. I f  DHS coordinates and approves all trainings, 
the integrity o f the topics and information will be ensured, as will the consistency o f a common 
curriculum. An additional benefit would be a seamless integration with the existing NIMS and ICS 
trainings.
Success o f this program could be measured by the decreased number o f responder and receiver injuries 
and deaths, as well as by better-controlled responses to chemical emergencies where the impact to the 
public is reduced due to fewer incidents, or through better management o f the incidents and increased 
protection o f the public through various protective measures. Implementation o f this program should 
occur within one year.
RECOM M ENDATION #9: Since all emergency responses occur at the local level, the D epartm ent 
of Hom eland Security should p a rtn e r with the D epartm ent of Health and H um an Services to 
provide both funding and logistical support for hands-on, real-tim e train ing, including functional 
drills, to support local interagency emergency response to chemical events.
One o f the common concerns and barriers to competency identified by members o f the responder and 
receiver communities is the lack o f opportunity to translate a book, seminar or web-based training into 
real-time and real life training scenarios. While hands-on, full-scale drills are becoming more accepted 
and widely used in the responder and receiver communities, they often focus on scenarios built around a 
large-scale, mass casualty event such as a bus or plane crash or pandemic viral outbreak (pan flu). The 
work group calls upon DHS and DHHS to provide both the financial and logistical support to enable 
communities and the responders and receivers who service them to plan and execute training drills 
directly related to chemical emergencies in their specific areas. The chemical scenarios drilled should be 
relevant and related to specific threats or chemical-related hazards present in the community, such as a 
leak at a local manufacturing plant or train derailment. This process must involve not only responders and 
receivers, but also members o f industry and the business community. Tribes, communities, and the public 
and their specific needs related to notification, evacuation and awareness education should be considered 
and taken into account when planning and performing a drill.
Members o f the Chemical Emergencies work group are also very aware o f the need to provide continuing 
training, including refresher training, to address the issue o f complacency, as well as resources for all first 
responders (including volunteers), at hours and locations that are accessible. DHS and DHHS should look 
for ways to partner with state and local resources to ensure the highest possible participation from all 
members o f the responder and receiver communities. This is particularly true in rural areas where many 
o f the intended training participants are volunteers and hold regular full-time employment elsewhere. 
Night and weekend trainings are necessary to allow these members an opportunity to attend training.
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The success o f this program should be measured by tracking the total number o f personnel trained, as well 
as their performance during drills, exercises, and responses to events. Implementation should occur in the 
near-term.
RECOM M ENDATION #10: OSHA, EPA, and NIOSH, together with other federal and state 
response agencies, need to develop clear, easy-to-understand chemical emergency exposure 
standards or guidance values which better represent real-life risks incurred  by first responders at 
chemical emergencies. These standards should require protection of responders according to the 
h ierarchy of controls.
Current resources used to determine the potential risk o f chemical specific exposures include, but are not 
limited to, OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) standards, NIOSH Recommended Exposure Limit 
(REL) and Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL) guidance values; current American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) Threshold Limit Value (TLV) guidance; EPA Acute 
Exposure Guideline Limits (AEGL); American Industrial Hygiene Association Emergency Response 
Planning Guidelines (ERPG); and US Department o f Energy (DOE) Temporary Emergency Exposure 
Limits (TEEL). For responder/receiver members, there is a gap between the recognized legal exposure 
values provided by OSHA and the exposure values provided by other entities such as NIOSH and the 
ACGIH. These values were developed for specific populations and circumstances. None o f these values 
were developed for guiding response and limiting exposures during an emergency situation. As a result of 
this gap, there is great concern and debate in the responder and receiver community, as well as the public, 
regarding which exposure value is applicable in an emergency. Further work is needed to develop similar 
protective standards that are tied directly to the current state o f knowledge and research regarding 
community exposure levels.
These standards should require protection o f responders according to the hierarchy o f controls. The 
hierarchy o f controls is a list o f steps that employers must take to prevent or reduce exposure to a hazard, 
ranked from most to least effective in terms o f effectiveness. At the top o f the hierarchy is the substitution 
o f a safer material, machine, or process; followed by the use o f engineering controls like mechanization, 
enclosure, and ventilation; then by the institution o f administrative controls such as limiting exposure 
time and distance, housekeeping, hygiene facilities, medical surveillance and air monitoring; and finally, 
the use o f personal protective equipment like hearing protection, respirators, gloves, goggles, and clothing 
forms the last rung o f the hierarchy.
Congress should streamline or remove the impediments that make it more difficult for OSHA to 
accomplish these goals. Congress should authorize and appropriate sufficient funds for the agencies to 
carry out this recommendation. Congress should examine and modify, and where appropriate, remove 
legislative and legal, as well as any other impediments, to the fulfillment o f this recommendation. Finally, 
the Office o f Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office o f Management and Budget should do 
everything in its power to facilitate its swift fulfillment.
Success o f this program could be measured by the reduced exposure o f responders, tribal communities, 
and the public as reported to various state and federal agencies, including the military. Implementation 
may take one to three years. OSHA shall continue to regularly evaluate standards established by this 
program to ensure proper protection o f responders and the public and adjust those standards as the need 
arises.
RECOM M ENDATION #11: There is a need for a single, user-friendly, accessible planning tool for 
toxicological hazard  and hazard  vulnerability analysis (HVA) for local response to chemical 
emergencies.
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This database must be a tool that is accessible to responders in the field by way of laptop, PDA, mobile 
smart phone, etc., as well as to receivers and members o f the public via the internet.
The DHS should support the National Library o f Medicine (NLM) and EPA in further developing, 
integrating, and disseminating modern response tools, including training for all district and local 
emergency management agencies and first responders. Existing tools such as NLM ’s Wireless 
Information Systems for Emergency Responders (WISER) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s (NOAA) Computer Aided Management o f Emergency Operations (CAMEO) provide 
partial data to support a response; however, they are lacking full functionality as a complete one-stop 
resource. Each program has been developed as a stand-alone function, and each contains information 
missing from others. W ISER is the preferred tool for many in the responder and receiver community and 
has wide name recognition. We envision an expanded body o f information within WISER to fully inform 
and educate planners, responders and receivers on chemical emergency response steps and needs.
A critical component o f this expanded body of information would be a functioning toxicologic hazard- 
vulnerability assessment tool that allows planners, responders, and receivers to correctly identify the 
nature and potential magnitude o f a chemical event. The ability to access this information in both the 
planning and the response phases would allow those involved in the mitigation/planning and the 
response/clean-up phases to better assess and plan for the community impact. With better planning and 
response information, those involved will have consistent guidance on multiple issues, such as selecting 
the most appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) for responders, deciding on evacuation or 
shelter-in-place for the community, selecting an antidote, and locating an antidote stockpile. We envision 
a comprehensive tool that bridges the gaps between scientific knowledge, risk management and best 
practices response planning.
Two future resources are in development. The NLM is currently developing an internet-based web portal 
to assist first responders, first receivers and emergency planners in preparing for and responding to 
chemical emergencies. The Chemical Emergency Medical Management (CHEMM) portal is under 
development and is similar to the popular internet site Radiation Emergency Medical Management 
(REMM). This portal will interact with WISER. Ideally, these products would be able to interact with 
tools such as CAMEO and MARPLOT that can help both identify and pinpoint hazards and assist with 
evacuation and containment modeling.
This tool should be made available to everyone, potentially through the clearinghouse discussed in 
recommendation #1. A public side o f this program should also be developed that allows local citizens and 
tribal communities access to information on known chemical storage and use sites in the community as 
well as basic education on health effects and response procedures. Information such as Material Safety 
Data Sheets (MSDS) and local response planning via a local emergency management agency could also 
be linked to the tool for public use.
Training should be provided on the use and function o f the program at no cost to the response community. 
DHS should task NLM and EPA with continuously upgrading and updating the program in order to meet 
the constantly changing needs o f the response community. Success o f this program could be measured by 
the number of response agencies that download versions o f this program and continue to upgrade the 
programs as updates and upgrades are issued by NLM and EPA. Implementation should be planned to 
occur within two years.
Tracking program usage, updates, and upgrades will serve as an indicator o f the value to responders and 
the success o f the training. Implementation should occur within two to three years.
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RECOM M ENDATION #12: The federal governm ent should provide support in concept and 
through funding for the ongoing development of a cadre of tra ined  and experienced Emergency 
Support Function 8 (ESF 8 health and medical) planners and responders who will improve 
emergency operational capabilities and critical decision-making as well as better integrate the tiers 
of private sector and governm ent responses to public health emergencies during chemical 
disasters/events.
To quote Dr. Margaret Chan o f the World Health Organization, “As the determinants and consequences 
o f  health emergencies become broader, so has the range o f  players with a stake in the security agenda. 
The new watchwords are diplomacy, cooperation, transparency and preparedness (WHO 2007).” To this 
end, planners must be educated and prepared to plan responses that integrate the capabilities and 
capacities o f the many diverse agencies and organizations that may be called upon to respond to a 
chemical emergency at any geopolitical level. The strategic objectives o f such a training program should 
be to:
1. Educate medical, public health, and emergency management professionals to serve as ESF #8 
(health and medical response) planners and response coordinators and to become leaders in this 
field
2. Provide an experienced and ready cadre o f personnel that can coordinate or assist in ESF #8 
planning and can augment ESF #8 response activities at the local, tribal, state and national levels
3. Enhance effectiveness o f ESF #8 regional planning and response partners at the local, state, tribal, 
and national levels by standardizing theory and methods
4. Create a highly competent and dynamic faculty/staff that trains organizations by coordinating or 
assisting in multi-jurisdictional planning and responses, as well educating students participating 
in the program
Such an ESF-8 program is currently in the pilot-testing phase o f development and is demonstrating 
promising results. The Yale/Tulane ESF-8 Planning and Response Program is a collaborative program 
bringing in diverse partners from academia; public health; and civilian, governmental and military sectors 
and is rooted in extensive after-action analysis o f large-scale disasters impacting health.14 It is also a 
multi-disciplinary, multi-center, graduate-level certificate program designed to produce ESF #8 planners 
and responders with standardized skill sets that are consistent with evolving public policy, technologies, 
and best practices (Y ale New Haven Center for Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response 2010). 
The program is intended to be accessible, sustainable, and replicable on a large scale. The education and 
training provided focus on a set o f base competencies. In its current format, the training addresses 
planning for chemical emergencies and includes internship placement for practical experience to improve 
translation from classroom theory to actual planning practice.
Through prior planning and training, leaders at the federal, tribal, state, and local levels will be better 
prepared to help coordinate response planning involving all stakeholders. Planners trained to optimize 
information flow and facilitate decision analysis through emergency operations will help to provide 
response plans designed to lessen the impact o f chemical emergencies on public health, continuity of 
operations, and local economies. As a result o f more effective planning and training, local responders will 
possess the improved skills and knowledge to properly place outside resources and governmental 
agencies most efficiently and in the greatest area o f need as they arrive on-scene to support operations. 
Additionally, as federal, tribal, and state agencies arrive, local responders will have a clearer 
understanding o f the capabilities, resources, and needs that accompany those federal, tribal, and state 
responders.
14For more information on the Yale/Tulane ESF-8 (Public Health and Medical Services) Planning and Response Program, see 
http://drlatulane.org/community/groups/haiti-recovery/resources/esf-8-haiti-updates.
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The success o f this program might be measured through improved plan quality, and by increased 
collaboration between local, state, tribal, and federal agencies that may need to respond to chemical 
emergencies on scene or by transporting and/or treating victims. As planners and plans bring diverse 
response agencies together prior to a chemical emergency, an integrated response to an actual chemical 
emergency may be enhanced. Implementation o f the training program should occur within one to two 
years and be sustained over the long term.
V. CONCLUSION
Several key themes are consistent throughout this report. When attempting to prevent, prepare for, 
respond to, recover from, or mitigate chemical incidents, there is a need for the following: (1) developing 
improved channels o f communication and better coordination among federal, state, local, and tribal 
agencies; (2) improving communication and outreach to community groups and residents, including 
answering the need for a single, centralized communications system that can serve as a more easily 
accessible portal for chemical safety information that is sometimes technical in nature, but available and 
in language that is understandable by the “lay-person”; and (3) developing improved and more extensive 
training and education for responders, receivers, and providers, particularly those at the local level. 
Realizing and recognizing the need for more resources may not always translate into increased funding 
for agencies at the federal, state, and/or local levels. Consideration should be given to re-evaluating the 
distribution o f current expenditures and resources available for chemical emergency prevention to 
determine where there is redundancy and duplication, identify priorities, and make any necessary 
adjustments to ensure that citizens and communities across the country are prepared for and more 
adequately protected from major chemical incidents. Lastly, the nation and its people will benefit most as 
the vast resources and energies that have been required until now for the reclamation o f the environment 
and the care o f people injured by chemical emergencies can be re-directed by our leaders toward the 
future protection o f all through a consummate intent and a deliberate design that strives to prevent 
chemical emergencies, reduces their frequency, and when all else fails, responds immediately and 
cohesively to minimize their impact.
VI. APPENDICES
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